Self Protection EW Manager by Eertink, B.J.
Nationaal Lucht- en Ruimtevaartlaboratorium
National Aerospace Laboratory NLR
NLR-TP-2003-084
Self Protection EW Manager
Prototype development and demonstration
B.J. Eertink
This report is based on a presentation held on the NATO Workshop SCI-130
"Integrated Defensive Aids Systems and Testing", China Lake, CA, USA,
3-6 March 2003.
This report may be cited on condition that full credit is given to NLR and the author.
Customer: National Aerospace Laboratory NLR
Working Plan number: V.1.B.1
Owner: National Aerospace Laboratory NLR
Division: Flight
Distribution: Unlimited
Classification title: Unclassified
February 2003
Approved by author: Approved by project manager: Approved by project managing
department:
-2-
NLR-TP-2003-084
Summary
The Self Protection Electronic Warfare (SP EW) manager is an automated system that provides
a link between the available onboard EW sensors and actors in an aircraft, determines the most
effective actions and, when possible, executes those actions. The National Technology Project
(NTP) SP EW manager aimed to define the requirements for a SP EW manager (Phase 1) and to
build a demonstrator that implements a representative subset of these requirements (Phase 2).
The project was triggered by significant effectiveness improvements, obtained by the combined
use of the chaff and RF jammer subsystems, as found in EW trials.
The main goal of the project was stipulated as: to develop a concept for a SP EW manager that
enables co-ordinated action of the available EW assets on a flying platform, while minimising
interaction with the crew. The main conclusion was that such a concept was successfully
developed, and that this concept proved to be workable. However, the developed SP EW
manager application is in its current form not fit for operational use, or even complete yet. It is a
prototype to demonstrate the capabilities of the concept.
This paper provides a top-level description of the developed management process. This process
consists of a Multi-Sensor Data Fusion part, that provides threat information to the Resource
Manager. The latter selects the most appropriate countermeasure techniques for the threat
situation, and schedules and executes the countermeasure actions.
In addition, an overview of the main findings is presented and discussed. It appeared that the
effectiveness of the countermeasure actions largely depends on the accuracy of the (sensor)-
data. Several shortcomings in the data fusion processes were identified. In the resource
management part, the inclusion of aircraft manoeuvre advices proved to be a major problem,
especially with regard to timing of the separate actions.
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Abbreviations and Acronyms
AAA Anti-Aircraft Artillery
CM Countermeasure
CMT Countermeasure Technique
EW Electronic Warfare
FEL Fysisch en Elektronisch Laboratorium
(Physics and Electronics Laboratory)
HMI Human-Machine Interface
HSD Horizontal Situation Display
ITEMS Interactive Tactical Environment Management System
NADDES NLR Avionics Display Development and Evaluation System
NTP National Technology Project
MSDF Multi Sensor Data Fusion
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NLR Nationaal Lucht- en Ruimtevaartlaboratorium
(National Aerospace Laboratory NLR)
POWER Pilot Oriented Workload Evaluation and Redistribution
RF Radio Frequency
RM Resource Manager
RNLAF Royal Netherlands Air Force
RNLN Royal Netherlands Navy
RTO Research and Technology Organisation
SA Situational Awareness
SAM Surface to Air Missile
SP Self Protection
TL Threat Level
TNO Nederlandse Organisatie voor Toegepast Natuurwetenschappelijk
Onderzoek
(Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research)
-5-
NLR-TP-2003-084
1 Introduction
The Self Protection Electronic Warfare (SP EW) manager is an automated system that provides
a link between the available onboard EW sensors and actors in an aircraft, determines the most
effective actions and, when possible, executes those actions. The SP EW manager project,
funded by the Netherlands Ministry of Defence and involving the Royal Netherlands Air Force
(RNLAF) and Royal Netherlands Navy (RNLN), aimed to define the requirements for such a
manager (phase 1) and to build a demonstrator that implements a representative subset of these
requirements (phase 2). The project was executed by the National Aerospace Laboratory (NLR)
and TNO Physics and Electronics Laboratory (TNO-FEL). It started in April 1997, and the final
report was delivered in October, 2000.
2 History, backgrounds
NLR has been supporting the RNLAF with the employment and optimisation of its EW assets
since the introduction of EW equipment on the F-104 in the early 1970s. From these early days
on, the integration, qualification and operational testing of EW equipment on the RNLAF
aircraft has been supported by NLR. This was possible by virtue of a national add-on
capability based on the combined RNLAF/NLR competencies and facilities as well as the NLR
expertise in the fields of threat system analysis, Electronic Warfare (EW) and avionics
installations. This expertise materialises in (among others) the RNLAF/NLR participation in
international (NATO) EW trials Mace and Embow.
In the Trials Mace V and VI in 1998/1990, the
RNLAF F-16 demonstrated that significant
effectiveness improvements could be obtained
by a combined use of the chaff and RF jammer
subsystems. To this end a so-called "Smart
Box" was developed by NLR which interfaced
with the antennae and Band modules of the
AN/ALQ-131 jammer and the AN/ALE-40
chaff dispensers on the F-16. During the trial
the effectiveness was demonstrated of the
automated, co-ordinated application of chaff
and jamming programs after initial detection
of a radar threat.
Figure 1 NLR Smart box unit and panel
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Demonstrating combined countermeasures in a controlled trial environment is one thing,
creating a pseudo-autonomous system that will operate in a multiple-threat scenario, is another.
This challenge was the topic of the SP EW manager project.
3 SP EW manager
3.1 Objectives
The prime goal of the project was to design and implement a SP EW Manager concept and to
perform a Proof-Of-Concept demonstration. This demonstration was to be held in a laboratory
environment, i.e. workstation based, and using a synthetic (threat) environment.
The original project proposal lists the following goals for the SP EW manager:
1 To develop a concept for a SP EW manager that enables co-ordinated action of the
available EW assets on a flying platform, while minimising interaction with the crew.
2 The SP EW manager will form the link between the available sensors and actors, will
determine the most effective use [of the actors] and execute actions when possible.
3 Such a SP EW manager will enable co-ordinated countermeasures that cannot be executed
manually using the separate systems, thus enhancing the effectivity of the EW assets and
reducing crew workload.
4 Development of the SP EW manager concept is not limited to the manager functionality, but
includes interfaces with sensors, actors and crew.
5 The SP EW manager concept shall be flexible, i.e.:
5.1 It must be platform independent.
5.2 It must be independent of hardware characteristics of the EW assets.
5.3 It must be independent of the number of available assets.
5.4 It must be adaptable to the scenario (threats, constraints).
3.2 General description
The SP EW Manager consists of several distinctive parts (see Figure 2):
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Figure 2 SP EW manager demonstrator components
• Multi-Sensor Data Fusion (MSDF)
The MSDF module receives the sensor data from the ITEMS simulation environment
(Ownship and scenario simulation, see section 3.3) and to add, modify or augment this data
in such a way that a realistic evaluation of the working of the resource manager (RM) is
enabled. Note that ITEMS does not really provide sensor data. Instead, it provides actual
threat information the moment the threat would have been detected, based on the specified
sensor characteristics.  MSDF needed to add more realism, such as latency, ambiguity and
inaccuracy. A Sensor Simulation component was included in the MSDF module to realise
this.
• Resource Manager (RM)
The RM module accepts the threat information from the MSDF module. Using a knowledge
based technique, it selects the most suitable Counter Measure Technique (CMT), and
executes the associated countermeasures. More detail on the RM processes are given in
section 3.4.
• Human-Machine Interface (HMI)
Development and optimisation of a Human-Machine Interface (HMI) for EW management
was not part of the project. However, to be able to evaluate the SP EW manager software, a
basic HMI was developed. This HMI consists of three parts:
▪ a Forward View display,
▪ threat and countermeasure displays,
▪ throttle, stick and buttons to control the simulated aircraft.
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3.3 Evaluation environment
For the demonstrator, two separate workstations were used: a SUN Ultra 60 to run the SP EW
manager software. The threat environment, provided by the simulation software ITEMS, runs
on a Silicon Graphics Indigo2 Maximum Impact workstation. The only additional hardware
component was the FlyBox. Figure 3 provides a graphical depiction of the hardware
components and their connections.
For the Evaluations, the SP EW Manager is linked to a simulation environment, the Interactive
Tactical Environment Management System (ITEMS), built by CAE Electronics. ITEMS
configures and runs a synthetic tactical environment, often referred to as an "electronic
battlefield". ITEMS provide all simulated entities: ownship (including sensors), Surface-to-air
threats and missiles.
Unfortunately, the simulated EW characteristics of the ITEMS players were limited. Responses
to chaff and flare were modelled with sufficient accuracy, but jamming effects were only
rudimentarily available. In addition, missile warning systems were not available. Therefore, the
basic ITEMS software was altered to supply realistic EW responses. ITEMS does not provide a
real, pulse-to-pulse, simulation of the radar. It simply checks whether or not the target reflects
enough energy to be detected, using basic radar formulae. For our purposes, track box
calculations and manipulation were introduced, that simulate only the effects of the
countermeasure techniques. These calculations also account for the fact that a track signal will
still be detected as long as the aircraft is in the beam, even though the track box may no longer
be on the aircraft (e.g. in case of RGPO jamming). Also, each jamming technique requires a
specific jam to signal ratio to be effective.
Figure 3  Demonstrator hardware components and their connections
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3.4 EW Management Process
The following basic process is applied to effectively counter detected threats:
1. One or more sensors detect a signal. The signal(s) are passed to the MSDF module and to
the Reflexive part of the RM module. If applicable, the latter will trigger an initial
response.
2. The MSDF processes the incoming signal(s), trying to match them with signals from other
sources and preplanned threat information. This process results in a threat list that is sent
to the RM module. A threat is, in the applied definition, not a physical entity, but rather an
instance that needs to be acted upon. For example: A SAM systems search radar detecting
the ownship will appear as a threat. Once the SAM starts tracking the ownship, a new threat
is generated (the tracking radar) and depending on the SAMs characteristics, the old threat
may disappear.
All threats in the list have the following properties:
• Identification (+ fidelity indication)
• Threat mode (Search, track, etc.)
• Threat Level (TL: numeric value 1-10, corresponding with far away search radar 
incoming missile on MAWS)
• Position & Velocity (incl. uncertainty bracket)
• For missiles: estimated time until intercept.
If the identification is ambiguous, multiple threats will be generated, each with its own
fidelity (e.g. ID1  70%; ID2  30%).
3. The RM applies a rule-based system to generate CMTs for each threat. The CMTs are
stored in a knowledge-base. Each CMT consists of one or more actions: manoeuvres,
jammer activation, chaff and/or flare dispense, or anything the ownship is capable of. The
CMTs can have applicability constraints like aspect angle, distance, altitude, required speed
or G-level. All actions inside a GMT will have associated start conditions. This can be a
time since CMT start, a time since the end of the preceding action, or reaching a prescribed
condition (e.g. azimuth angle to threat, G-level).
Techniques are assigned an effectiveness value, that is used to select between techniques
if more then one is available.
4. All selected CMTs (basically, one for each threat) are passed on to the CM scheduler. The
scheduler will analyse the actions and their start conditions in the CMT and integrate them
all in an overall schedule. The CMT for the threat with the highest TL will be scheduled
first. If there is a conflict, the CMT is rejected. The process in step 3 will then suggest the
next possible CMT for scheduling, until a working solution is found. If there are no
alternatives, the same CMT is suggested, until it can be put on the schedule. Note that
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execution starts when the first CMT is scheduled, so even when no alternative CMT is
found, the conflict may be automatically resolved when the CMT is re-tried.
5. The resulting schedule is presented to the crew (see section 3.5), and in automatic mode,
automatically executed. When manoeuvres are part of the schedule, these are presented
via voice messages, and must be executed by the crew.
6. If a new threat with a higher threat level is detected during the execution of a schedule, and
the selected CMT for the new threat uses the same resources as (one of) the running CMTs,
then the running CMT will be cancelled in favour of countering the new #1 priority. The
manager will try to find an alternative for the other threat as described in step 4.
This process is continuously repeated as long as the sensors are detecting threat signals. When a
threat disappears from the threat list, all associated CMT actions are removed from the schedule.
Soft kill assessment is provided by using the mechanism of assigning new threats on the basis of
system mode. For example, if break-lock is achieved due to the applied countermeasures, the
associated threat (tracking radar) will disappear. The same applies when the reflex
countermeasures are effective: the threat will disappear, possibly even before a CMT can be
scheduled.
3.5 Manager modes
The SP EW manager is controlled by the crew by choosing between system modes off,
standby (processes running, threat information displayed, but no scheduling) or on. In
addition, the applicable rules could be constrained by selecting one of the following
operational modes:
• Run Silent (manoeuvres only)
• Minimum Expendables (manoeuvres & jamming)
• Minimum Jamming (manoeuvres & expendables)
• Constrained Manoeuvring (expendables & jamming)
• No restrictions
If any mode other than No restrictions is selected, the choice of CMTs is constrained
accordingly. However, if the threatlevel exceeds 8 (i.e. illuminator or missile launch detect), all
restrictions are dropped.
3.6 Human-Machine Interface
The threat and countermeasure displays were developed specifically for the project. For this
development, the NLR Avionics Display Development and Evaluation System (NADDES)
was used. The display provides a gods eye view of the aircraft and its environment, including a
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time scale displaying the currently running countermeasure technique(s) (see Figure 4). The
colour of the threat changes when the threat level changes (grey = no threat, through red =
missile detect).
Timescale
CM start indicator
Planned CMs
Running CMs
Highest priority
threat
Jammer mode Chaff/Flare counters
System
mode
Operational
mode
Planned route
Range/azimuth
error indication
Display range (nm)
Missile range
Figure 4  SP EW manager threat display
4 SP EW manager evaluation
4.1 Evaluation set-up
In order to be able to evaluate the management concept, four different scenarios were created: 2
for a jet fighter and 2 for a four-engine turboprop aircraft. Each aircraft type was fitted with a
representative set of EW sensors and CM assets. 8 different threat types were defined for use in
the scenarios: 4 radar guided SAM systems, 3 infrared guided SAM systems (one fitted with a
search radar, and 2 man portable systems) and 1 AAA system. In order to avoid classification of
the project results, fictitious data were used for the threat characteristics, as well as for the
aircraft and sensor data. In the evaluations, 11 missions were "flown" using the four scenarios.
The different missions incorporated different operational modes, different altitudes, and
different sets of intell information.
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4.2 Evaluation findings
• Accurate sensors are of paramount importance, both with regard to identifying and to
locating the threat. This becomes a greater issue when multiple threats are detected.
Identification is important to optimise performance, and to reduce ambiguity. Accurate
locations are important to optimise manoeuvre advises, and to get better threat level
computations. Sensor output must be accurate enough to enable earth-stabilised location
information. Otherwise, the threats will move around during manoeuvres, which may lead
to erroneous advises.
Sensors and MSDF should provide some form of memory tracking. In the demonstrator, a
threat disappears (and associated CMTs are cancelled) after two seconds when it is
manoeuvred outside the antenna patterns of the sensors. Memory tracking should also
account for the loss of tracks due to line of sight limitations: threats that are (temporarily)
shielded by the terrain should remain available even though they are not currently a real
threat. When they are detected again, this could speed up identification. Also, they remain
available for display, so the crew remains aware of their existence. Obviously, this requires
a digital terrain model, and accurate position information.
• Inclusion of manoeuvre advices proved to be a major difficulty in realising SP EW
manager. Because it is not allowed to execute manoeuvres automatically, it should be
checked whether or not the crew is correctly following (or even: intends to follow) the
advice. It was not possible to devise a satisfactory solution within the scope of this project.
As a stop-gap solution, a crew-reject button was introduced, enabling the crew to reject a
CMT if they are not able to follow the advice.
As a result, it cannot be predicted when an advised manoeuvre will start, and even less
when it is going to be finished. Therefore, if the crew does not reject the CMT, execution of
follow-on actions is postponed until a prescribed condition (e.g. azimuth with regard to
threat) is met. If these conditions are not met, the actions stays on the schedule until the
threat disappears. Meanwhile, no other CMT is planned because the threat is already being
countered.
• It is not possible to regard the MSDF and RM modules as totally independent entities. Some
form of feedback from the RM to the MSDF remains necessary. This came the most clear in
threat level changes that were caused due to RM-prompted manoeuvres (e.g. because the
threat has limited tail-on capability), which resulted in the CMT to be cancelled. To prevent
this from happening, the MSDF must know that an azimuth change is a result of the
running CMT, and threat level changes due to this azimuth change are therefore not
allowed. In addition, the RM must be able to cue the MSDF to collect additional data on a
specific threat.
• Due to the limited capabilities of the current missile warning systems and MSDF, only basic
missile countermeasures can be performed. More sophisticated countermeasures would
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require the introduction of dynamic missile modelling within SP EW manager. This was
outside the scope of the project.
4.3 Other experiments
After completion of the evaluations in the SP EW manager project, the demonstrator was, in an
adapted form, used in Human Factors evaluations as part of the POWER (Pilot Oriented
Workload Evaluation and Redistribution) project. This project aimed at demonstrating a generic
Crew Assistant (CA) environment and individual tactical decision support tools to pilots in a
simulated environment. This time NLRs full-scale F-16 simulator facilities were used, showing
the EW manager display as an alternative Horizontal Situation Display (HSD). Nine RNLAF
F-16 pilots participated in this study.
Results of this project were briefed in the RTO SCI-113 Lecture Series number LS 227, entitled
Tactical Decision Aids and Situational Awareness, in November 2001. This project focused
on usability issues, pilot acceptance and Situational Awareness (SA). With regard to the EW
manager, it was found that pilots were sceptical about the usability of the manager, but after
using it in the simulator they were more convinced (after using NCMM) that:
• It performs like a real pilot.
• Integration in the aircraft may be adequate.
• It does not show too much irrelevant/distracting details.
• It is capable of taking pilot personal preferences into account.
• It is sufficiently sensitive to specific mission demands.
The most important results concerning the system application (use) were that pilots, after using
the system:
• have confidence in the system and will as such use it.
• will not necessarily (eventually) loose EW related skills when using it.
• do not expect it to cause task saturation or -fixation.
Observations indicate that SA improved when using the EW manager, and fewer errors were
made in controlling the EW assets. Complete results can be found in the Lecture Series report:
RTO-EN-019 AC/323(SCI-113)TP/41.
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5 Future Prospects
After formal completion of the SP EW project in October 2000, demonstrations of the system
were given to the RNLAF and the RNLN. As mentioned in section 4.3, the application was used
in the POWER project evaluations in 2001. The logical next step would have been to develop
interfaces with real EW hardware, and to evaluate the system in an EW trial. Plans were made
to realise this, but unfortunately they never materialised for lack of funds.
Currently, discussions are ongoing to define a follow-on to the POWER project. Further
development of the SP EW manager could be part of this effort.
6 Conclusion
The major goal of the project, to develop and demonstrate a concept for EW management, was
met. Even though not all functional requirements could be implemented to the full, the concept
for EW management was shown to be effective. Co-ordinated action of all assets is available,
and except for the execution of tactics, crew interaction is not necessary (although it remains
possible) for execution of countermeasure techniques. Exact timing of chaff and flare dispenses
during a manoeuvre is possible, as well as exact balancing of start and duration of jamming with
dispense actions. Determination of enhanced effectivity and reduced workload could not be
established using the current demonstrator. This will require a more sophisticated test
environment. However, successful project completion does not mean that the developed SP EW
manager application is suitable for operational use, or even complete yet. It is very much a
prototype to demonstrate the capabilities of the developed concept. As such, it has been
successful, but it's only the first step in developing an operational SP EW manager. The
additional research in the POWER project has shown that pilots indicated that an EW manager
is a valuable asset, that helps improve Situational Awareness and reduce errors.
